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1Abstract
This paper discusses issues of axiomatic bargaining problems
over opportunity assignments. The fair arbitrator uses the princi-
ple of “equal opportunity” for all players to make the recommen-
dation on resource allocations. A framework in such a context is
developed and several classical solutions to standard bargaining
problems are reformulated and axiomatically characterized.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: C71, C78, D60, D63, D70
Keywords: Opportunity sets, bargaining over opportunity assign-
ments, Nash solution, egalitarian solution, Kalai-Smorodinsky so-
lution
21 Introduction
In standard axiomatic bargaining models originated from Nash (1950), a
typical interpretation of the solution to bargaining problems is the recom-
mendation made by a “fair arbitrator” such as the Judge in civil trials, or the
function of Dispute Settlement Body in the WTO mechanism, etc. In such
models, the recommendation is based solely on players’ utilities. In many
contexts, however, the “fair arbitrator” may have other principles in mind
when making a recommendation.
For instance, consider the distribution issue of a father’s inheritance
among his children. The father, as a “fair arbitrator,” may have the prin-
ciple of “equal opportunities” for his children and would like to distribute
his wealth among his children giving them equal opportunities to do well in
their respective lives. Likewise, when educational resources are to be allo-
cated among local public schools, the local government’s board of education,
as the “fair arbitrator,” may propose an allocation that “equalizes” school
children’s opportunity sets for future jobs, skills, college admissions, lives, etc.
In both settings of the above examples, each recommendation of a resource
allocation by the “fair arbitrator” eﬀectively identiﬁes a proﬁle of “opportu-
nities” or opportunity sets for individuals involved. The crucial diﬀerence
from standard axiomatic bargaining models in these examples is that the
recommendation made by the arbitrator is not based on utilities of the in-
dividuals involved, but on opportunity sets that the recommended resource
allocation may give rise to the involved individuals.
This departure from considerations of utilities of individuals to concerns
of opportunity sets of individuals is well in line with the recent literature on
opportunities and equality of opportunities. One stream of the literature is
in political philosophy such as Sen (1980, 1985), Arneson (1989), and Cohen
(1993), while the other stream is in economics, see, for example, Sen (2002),
Pattanaik and Xu (1990), Kranich (1996), and Herrero (1997). In the latter
stream of the literature, each individual is characterized by his opportunity
sets, from which his well-being or welfare is evaluated.
An opportunity set of an individual is interpreted as a set of feasible op-
tions or alternatives available to the individual for living a life. Depending
on the context, those alternatives can be commodity bundles, or bundles of
characteristics àl aLancaster and Gorman, or bundles of functionings àl a
Sen (1980, 1985), and Nussbaum (1988, 1993, 2000). A resource allocation in
an economy then identiﬁes a collection of opportunity sets, one for each indi-
3vidual in the economy. Note that, for a given resource allocation, opportunity
sets of individuals are necessarily interdependent. Note also that diﬀerent
resource allocations can give rise to various collections of opportunity sets
for the individuals in the economy.
T h eq u e s t i o nt h a tw ew a n tt oh a v ea na n s w e ri nt h i sp a p e ri st h ef o l -
lowing. Among various collections of opportunity sets for the individuals
involved, how should the “fair arbitrator” make the recommendation on a
resource allocation that yields a proﬁle of opportunity sets for individuals
in the economy deemed as “fair”? For this purpose, we extend standard
bargaining models to the setting in which each individual is endowed with
his opportunity sets, which are generated by his consumption bundles given
his individual characteristics, and, in which the fair arbitrator makes rec-
ommendations based on proﬁles of opportunity sets for the individuals in
the economy.1 In particular, we reformulate the three classical solutions, the
Nash, the egalitarian, and the Kalai-Smorodinsky, in our context and study
them axiomatically.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we intro-
duce our economic environments and our problem. Section 3 presents some
preliminary properties on the social evaluation of opportunity sets and deﬁnes
the three solutions, the Nash, the egalitarian, and the Kalai-Smorodinsky, in
our context. Section 4 presents the axioms used for our characterization
results. In Section 5, we axiomatically characterize and present some inter-
pretations for the three solutions. We conclude the paper in Section 5 by
brieﬂy commenting on our approach and the results.
2 Economic environments and bargaining prob-
lems on opportunity assignments
There are (possibly) inﬁnitely many types of goods (commodities). The
universe of “potential goods” is denoted by Ξ, and the class of non-empty
and ﬁnite subsets of Ξ is designated by M, with generic elements, K, L,
M,...,. The cardinality of M ∈ M is denoted by #M.G i v e nM ∈ M,l e t
Rm
+,w h e r em =# M, designate the Cartesian product of #M copies of R+ .
1Gotoh and Yoshihara (2003) discuss allocation mechanisms which assign individuals
capability sets through distributing outputs produced by them. Their approach is quite
diﬀerent from the approach based on bargaining that this paper addresses.
4For each M ∈ M, let us denote generic commodity bundle in Rm
+ by x ∈ Rm
+.
T h ep o p u l a t i o ni nt h ee c o n o m yi sg i v e nb yt h es e tN = {1,···,n},w h e r e
2 ≤ n<+∞.G i v e nal i s to fc o m m o d i t i e sM ∈ M, every individual has a
common consumption space Rm
+.T h e r ea r ek basic living conditions in the
economy, which are relevant for all individuals for the purpose of describing
their objective well-beings attainable by means of their consumption vectors.
These basic living conditions can be interpreted broadly. For example, they
can be skills that individuals can develop through education, or they can be
occupations which individual can engage in after the graduation of school. Or
they can be characteristics of commodities in the sense of Gorman (1980) and
Lancaster (1966), or they can be various functionings according to Sen (1980,
1985) and Nussbaum (1988, 1993, 2000). For our formal analysis, we do not
need to stick to a particular interpretation though a certain interpretation
may be more appropriate than other interpretations for a given context.
Thus, an achievement of living condition f,w h e r ef =1 ,2,···,k,b y
individual i is denoted by bif ∈ R+. Individual i’s achievement of basic
living conditions is given by listing bif: bi =( bi1,···,b ik) ∈ Rk
+.G i v e n




+ which associates to every consumption vector
xi ∈ Rm
+ a non-empty subset cm
i (xi) of Rk
+. The intended interpretation
is that i is able to have access to each living-condition vector bi ∈ cm
i (xi)
by means of his consumption vector xi. Each opportunity correspondence
satisﬁes the following requirements:
(a) For all xi,x 0
i ∈ Rm
+ such that xi ≤ x0
i, cm
i (xi) ⊆ cm
i (x0
i) hold;2
(b) For some xi ∈ Rm
+\{0}, cm
i (xi) ∩ Rk
++ 6= ∅ holds, and cm
i (0)={0};
(c) For all xi ∈ Rm
+, cm
i (xi) is compact and comprehensive in Rk
+;a n d
(d) cm
i is continuous on Rk
+.
Let CM be the set of all possible opportunity correspondences deﬁned on
Rm
+, which satisfy the above (a), (b),(c) and (d). Given M ∈ M,a neconomy
with x endowments of M-goods is described by a list e =( M,cm,x)=
(M,(cm
i )i∈N,x),w h e r eM ∈ M, cm ∈ CMn, x ∈ Rm
+,a n dCMn stands for the
n-fold Cartesian product of CM.L e tEM be the class of all such economies
with x endowments of M-goods. Let E ≡∪
M∈M
EM.G i v e ne =( M,cm,x) ∈
2For all vectors a =( a1,...,a p) and b =( b1,...,b p) ∈ Rp, a ≥ b if and only if ai ≥ bi
(i =1 ,...,p); a > b if and only if a ≥ b and a 6= b; a À b if and only if ai >b i
(i =1 ,...,p).
5EM,av e c t o rx =( xi)i∈N ∈ Rmn




xi ≤ x. W ed e n o t eb yA(e) the set of feasible allocations
for e ∈ EM.L e tA(E) ≡∪
e∈E
A(e).
For each individual i ∈ N,g i v e nM ∈ M and given i’s consumption vec-
tor xi, cm
i (xi) generates a opportunity set Ci = cm
i (xi) for i.A no p p o r t u n i t y
assignment is a list of n opportunity sets one for each individual in the so-
ciety. Given e =( M,cm,x) ∈ E,t h eset of possible opportunity assignments
for e ∈ E is:
C(e) ≡ {C =( Ci)i∈N ⊆ R
kn
+ | ∃ x =( xi)i∈N ∈ A(e):Ci = c
m
i (xi) (∀i ∈ N)}.
Note that for any e =( M,cm,x) ∈ E,a n yC =( Ci)i∈N ∈ C(e),a n d
any i ∈ N, the opportunity Ci is a compact, comprehensive set in Rk
+
containing the origin. For each i ∈ N and each living condition f =
1,...,k,l e tmaxf (Ci) be the maximum amount of living condition f by
i that he can achieve under his opportunity set Ci ;t h a ti s ,maxf (Ci) ≡
max{bf | (b1,···,b f,···,b k) ∈ Ci}.L e t Σ ≡ {C | ∃e ∈ E : C = C(e)} be the
class of all such possible sets of opportunity assignments. Note that each
set C in Σ is compact in terms of Hausdorﬀ metric by the assumption (d)
of the opportunity correspondence and the fact that A(e) is compact for
every e ∈ E.A l s o , f o r a n y C ∈ Σ,i fC =( Ci)i∈N ∈ C,t h e nf o re a c h












j ⊆ Cj by the
assumption of (a), (b), and (d) of opportunity correspondences.
Let K be the universal class of compact, comprehensive subsets in Rk
+
containing the origin. Thus, C ∈ K implies that for any M ∈ M,t h e r e
exists cm ∈ CM such that for some x ∈ Rm
+, cm(x)=C. Note that for each
C ∈ Σ and every i ∈ N,t h e r ee x i s t sC∗








∈ C with C0
j ≡ {0} for any j 6= i.T h i si sf o l l o w e d
from the requirement (a) of opportunity correspodences and the deﬁnition of
Σ.G i v e nC ∈ Σ, let us denote such C∗
i by mi(C) for each i ∈ N.
The formal problem that we are interested in is the bargaining problem
over opportunity assignments among individuals. Analogous to the standard
bargaining model, we can interpret each C ∈ Σ as a bargaining problem,
and a solution to the problem is to pick up a subset of opportunity assign-
ments {C =( Ci)i∈N} from C.T h e n ,abargaining solution in this context is
a correspondence F which associates to every C ∈ Σ, a non-empty subset
F(C) ⊆ C.
6How is our model related to the motivation discussed in the Introduction?
The following examples may help us in understanding our approach.
Example 1: Let k be the number of skills that an individual can develop
through education, and let x ∈ Rm
+ be an educational resource. Then, the k
dimensions of the opportunity set cm
i (x) ⊆ Rk
+ represent the types of skills,
and each element bi =( bif)f∈{1,...,k} ∈ cm
i (x) implies that individual i can
develop the level of each skill f up to bif, whenever he is educated with the
educational support x and some amount of his own eﬀort. The diﬀerence of
native talents among individuals is reﬂected in the diﬀerence of opportunity
correspondences among them. In this setting, the bargaining problem would
be to assign opportunities for future skills by allocating educational resources.
Example 2: The WTO consists of many member countries and a part of its
functions is to settle disputes among its member countries. Disputes between
or among member countries are really about net trades of goods, services or
capital. The Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO is thus to make rec-
ommendations as how to structure net trades among the aﬀected member
countries.3 Each member country is concerned about, for example, the ag-
gregagte employment rate, the growth rates of several sectors like manufac-
turing, agriculture, and service, and the health condition of its population.
These concerns of a member country correspond to our notion of achieve-
ments. Each member country’s interests can be captured by the country’s
opportunity sets representing opportunities to have a certain degree of em-
ployment rate, to have reasonable growth rates for its concerned sectors, and
to oﬀer its population a good health. The bargaining problem can then be
interpreted as follows. The Dispute Settlement Body in the WTO mechanism
acts as the fair arbitrator and it recommends the settlements that aﬀect net
trade based on equal opportunities for the disputed member countries along
the factors that we discussed above.
Example 3: O u rl a s te x a m p l ec o n c e r n st h ea l l o c a t i o no ft h eb u d g e tb y
a central government to its several local jurisdictions. In many cases, the
3Quite often, disputes seemingly are about things like access to member countries’
markets and information, legal protection concerning trades from member countries,o r
pricing rules. These are rules governing trade between and among nations and they have
direct eﬀect on net trade between member countries. As a consequence, we can interpret
that disputes are really about net trade.
7allocation of the budget by the central government to its local jurisdictions
intends for diﬀerent localities to have equal opportunities for growth and
for access to clean water, for example. Growth and access to clean water
are two of the many factors that diﬀerent local jurisdictions are concerned
about, and local governments are concerned about their opportunities along
these factors. The bargaining problem in this example can thus be viewed
as the fair arbitrator, the central government, makes budgetary allocations
on the basis of equal opportunies for diﬀerent local jurisdictions along those
factors such as growth and environmenal quality of each region.
3 Three Bargaining Solutions
In this section, we will introduce three bargaining solutions in our context.
To do this, we need an objective measure to evaluate the relative wellness of
alternative opportunity sets. All of the three solutions that we will introduce
in the next subsection are based on the type of such objective measure. With
diﬀerent objective measures, the recommendation by a bargaining solution
can be diﬀerent. This is because there is no ap r i o r i , unique measure for
evaluating diﬀerent opportunity sets appropriately. Note that, in the case
of the standard bargaining models with individual utilities, there is no com-
plexity in measuring individuals’ utilities. In our context, however, we need
to start with the discussion on how to measure opportunity sets.
We therefore begin by deﬁning a social ordering over opportunity sets.
Such an ordering gives us information about objective measures for evaluating
various opportunity sets.
3.1 Properties on orderings over opportunity sets
An objective measure of alternative opportunity sets is formalized as a binary
relation R ⊆ K×K .T h e r e l a t i o n R satisﬁes reﬂexivity: [for all C ∈ K,
(C,C) ∈ R], completeness: [for all C,C0 ∈ K, (C,C0) ∈ R or (C0,C) ∈ R],
and transitivity: [for all C,C0,C00 ∈ K,i f(C,C0) ∈ R & (C0,C00) ∈ R,t h e n
(C,C00) ∈ R]. Thus, R is an ordering over K.N o t eP and I are respectively
the asymmetric and symmetric parts of R.
For all C,C0 ∈ K,w ew r i t eC>C 0 if for all b0 ∈ C0,t h e r ee x i s t sb ∈ C
such that b À b0. Note that, given the comprehensiveness of opportunity
sets in K,w h e nC>C 0, necessarily, we have C0 as a proper subset of C.
8In this paper, we assume that the ordering R on K satisﬁes the following
two properties:
Monotonicity: For all C,C0 ∈ K,i fC ⊇ C0 then (C,C0) ∈ R,a n di f
C>C 0,t h e n(C,C0) ∈ P.
Cardinal Representability: There exists a real-valued, continuous func-




where G is unique up to a positive aﬃne transformation.
It may be noted that, in our context, Monotonicity is a fairly non-
controvercial property and it essentially requires that a “bigger” opportunity
set be ranked higher than a “smaller” opportunity set. Similar conditions
have been used in the literature on ranking opportunity sets, see for exam-
ple, Gaertner and Xu (2006), Pattanaik and Xu (2006), and Xu (2002, 2004).
Cardinal Representability requires the function G which represents the or-
dering be cardinal. See Pattanaik and Xu (2000), Xu (2004), and Savaglio
and Vannucci (2006) for examples of such cardinal representations of a binary
relation over opportunity sets.
In addition to the above two basic properties to be imposed on the order-
ing R, in some cases, we also impose the following property on the ordering
R:
Homotheticity: For all C,C
0 ∈ K,a n da l lα > 0, (C,C0) ∈ R ⇔
¡




In our context of bargaining over opportunity assignments, homothetic-
ity of G may be viewed as a reasonable property. Recall that, in our set-
ting, the opportunity set {0} can be regarded as the “disagreement point”.
Then, for any opportunity set C, there is a chance that an individual has
the opportunity set C when an agreement is reached (the individual would
e n du pw i t h{0} when there is no agreement reached). Let p>0 be
the probability that an agreement can be reached. Then, homotheticity
of G basically says that the ranking of any two opportunity sets C and
C0 should be independent of this probability p so that (C,C0) ∈ R iﬀ
(p · C +( 1− p) ·{ 0},p· C0 +( 1− p) ·{ 0}) ∈ R;t h a ti s ,(C,C0) ∈ R iﬀ
(p · C,p · C0) ∈ R.
93.2 Three solutions
Given a social evaluation of opportunity sets R satisfying Monotonicity and
Cardinal Representability and its representation G, the three solutions we
consider in the paper are deﬁned as follows:
Nash Solution: A bargaining solution FNA is the Nash solution if, for
















Egalitarian Solution: A bargaining solution FE is the egalitarian solution
if, for every C ∈ Σ, C ∈ FE(C) implies that: (1) there is no other C0 ∈ C
such that (C0
i,C i) ∈ P for all i ∈ N; and (2) (Ci,C j) ∈ I holds for any
i,j ∈ N.
Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution: A bargaining solution FKS is the Kalai-
Smorodinsky solution if, for every C ∈ Σ, C ∈ FKS(C) implies that: (1)
there is no other C0 ∈ C such that (C0





4 Axioms on bargaining solutions
In this section, we shall present and discuss axioms on bargaining solutions
over opportunity assignments. The ﬁrst two axioms are the corresponding
eﬃciency type axioms in standard bargaining models.
Eﬃciency (E): For each C ∈ Σ and each C =( Ci)i∈N ∈ F(C),t h e r ei sn o
C0 =( C0
i)i∈N ∈ C such that for every i ∈ N, C0
i ⊇ Ci, and for some j ∈ N,
C0
j >C j.
Weak Eﬃciency (WE): For each C ∈ Σ and each C =( Ci)i∈N ∈ F(C),
there is no C0 =( C0
i)i∈N ∈ C such that for every i ∈ N, C0
i >C i.
Therefore, the axiom (E) requires that, for a opportunity assignment C to
be considered as a part of the solution to a problem, there must not exist an-
other feasible opportunity assignment C0 such that Ci ⊆ C0
i for all i ∈ N and
10C0
i >C i for at least one i ∈ N. (E) corresponds to the usual eﬃciency axiom
in the standard bargaining model. (WE) is a weaker requirement than (E)
and requires that the solution should not select an opportunity assignment
that is strictly dominated by another feasible opportunity assingment.
To introduce our next two axioms, we ﬁrst deﬁne notions of a symmetric
opportunity assignment and related concepts. Let C ∈ Σ.W e s a y t h a t
C ∈ Σ is symmetric if for every permutation π : N → N,a n df o re v e r y




i∈N ∈ C holds. If C∗ =( C∗
i )i∈N ∈ Kn
is such that C∗
i = C∗
j for any i,j ∈ N,t h e nC∗ is said to be a symmetric
opportunity assignment.
Let Λ ⊆ R+ be a set of index numbers with the minimal value 0 ∈ Λ.L e t
{Cs}s∈Λ ⊆ Kn be a sequence of symmetric assignments such that (a) for any
s ∈ Λ, Cs ∈ Kn is a symmetric assignment; (b) for any s,s0 ∈ Λ with s<s 0,
Cs ⊆ Cs0;a n d( c )C0 = {0}.W e c a l l s u c h {Cs}s∈Λ a monotone path of
symmetric assignments. In general, Λ is not a closed set. If Λ is closed, then
there exists the maximal symmetric assignment Cs∗ in {Cs}s∈Λ. In this case,
{Cs}s∈Λ is called a closed monotone path of symmetric assignments. C ∈ Σ
is said to be symmetric with a closed monotone symmetric path of symmetric
assignments {Cs}s∈Λ if C is symmetric, and {Cs}s∈Λ ⊆ C is such that the
maximal symmetric assignment Cs∗ is a weakly eﬃcient assignment in C.
Anonymity (A): For each C ∈ Σ,i fC is symmetric,t h e nf o re a c hC ∈
F(C) and each permutation π over N, π(C) ∈ F(C).
Symmetry (S): For each C ∈ Σ,i f C is symmetric with a closed monotone
symmetric path of symmetric assignments {Cs}s∈Λ,t h e nF(C)∩{Cs}s∈Λ 6=
∅, and for no C ∈ F(C), Ci >C j for some i,j ∈ N.
The axiom (A) requires that, for each symmetric problem, if an oppor-
tunity assignment C is selected by the solution, so is every permutation of
C. The axiom (S) stipulates that, for each symmetric problem with a closed
monotone symmetric path of symmetric assignments {Cs}s∈Λ, then the solu-
tion selects at least one opportunity assignment from {Cs}s∈Λ, and further,
for no opportunity assignment selected by the solution is such that one indi-
vidual’s opportunity set strictly dominates another individual’s opportunity
set.
The following axioms are analogous to the axioms of contraction indepen-
dence and of weak contraction independence in standard bargaining models:
11Contraction Independence (CI): For each C,C0 ∈ Σ with C ⊇ C0,i f
F(C) ∩ C0 6= ∅, then F(C0)=F(C) ∩ C0.
Weak Contraction Independence (WCI): For each C,C0 ∈ Σ with C ⊇
C0 and mi (C)=mi (C0) for all i ∈ N, if F(C) ∩ C0 6= ∅, then F(C0)=
F(C) ∩ C0.
The axiom (CI) corresponds to Nash’s Independence of Irrelevant Alter-
natives in standard bargaining models. It requires that if an opportunity
assignment is chosen from a “larger” problem and is still available when the
larger problem shrinks to a smaller problem, then it should be chosen from
the smaller problem as well. (WCI) is a restrictive version of (CI) by re-
quiring two problems of having the same “ideal” opportunity assignment.
Its origin in standard bargaining models goes back to Yu (1973) (see Xu
and Yoshihara (2006) for an application of this axiom in characterizing the
Kalai-Smorodinsky solution for nonconvex problems).
The next axiom is perhaps most controversial in our context:
Invariance to Aﬃne Changes in opportunity Correspondences (IACC):




a · C =( ai · Ci)i∈N ⊆ Rkn
+ | C ∈ C
ª
,t h e nC ∈ F(C) ⇔ a · C ∈ F(C0).
We ﬁrst note that the axiom of (IACC) cannot be interpreted as an analogy
to the scale invariance axiom of standard bargaining problems over utility
allocations. The k components of living conditions are assumed to be com-
mon to all individuals and are supposed to be objectively measurable. These
units are used to identify each individual’s attainable living-condition vectors
and each individual’s opportunity sets. Consequently, the fair arbitrator can
make interpersonal comparisons of living-condition vectors and interpersonal
comparisons of opportunity sets. The common social ordering R over oppor-
tunity sets for all individuals can be justiﬁed on the ground that there exist
such k units for measuring living-condition levels.
Given this implicit presumption in our framework, we cannot interpret
the change of one individual’s opportunity set from Ci to C0
i = ai · Ci as
the change in units of k living conditions for measuring individual i’s well-
being. If it was so, other individuals’ opportunity sets would have also been
transformed by the same aﬃne parameter ai. The axiom (IACC), however,
permits the situation of ai 6= aj between two diﬀerent individuals i and j.
12Therefore, we are reluctant to interpret the axiom (IACC) in terms of the
invariance to interpersonally diﬀerent units of k living conditions.
The most plausible interpretation of the change from Ci to C0
i = ai · Ci
is, we think, the change of i’s opportunity correspondence. In other words,
individual i’s “productivity” of living conditions is either improved (ai > 1)
or deteriorated (ai < 1). The axiom (IACC) then suggests that the change
in relative bargaining powers as reﬂe c t e di ne a c hi n d i v i d u a li’s ai should not
aﬀect the underlying resource allocations of commodities. In a sense, the
axiom seems to protect a relatively weak bargainer from a relatively strong
bargainer. On the other hand, the axiom (IACC) also suggests that the
society should not compensate someone for the deterioration of his “produc-
tivity” of living conditions through a redistributive policy.
Our ﬁnal axiom is an informational requirement on a solution to a problem
and is stated below:
Informational Invariance (II) : For each C ∈ Σ and each C =( Ci)i∈N,C0 =
(C0
i)i∈N ∈ C, if C ∈ F(C) and (C0
i,C i) ∈ I for all i ∈ N,t h e nC0 ∈ F(C).
According to the axiom (II), if two opportunity assignments are “equiva-
lent” in the sense that the two opportunity sets for each and every individual
speciﬁed by the corresponding opportunity assignments are ranked equally,
then whenever one opportunity assignment is chosen by the solution, the
other opportunity assignment should be chosen by the solution as well. The
a x i o m( I I )t h u si m p l i e st h a tt h ei n f o r m a t i o n a lr e q u i r e m e n ti no u rc o n t e x ti s
contained exclusively in the social evaluation ordering R. A similar axiom,
called No Discrimination, is discussed by Thomson (1983) in the context of
fair allocation problems.
5 Main Results and Interpretations
Before we present our characterization results, the following observations are
useful throughout this section. Let G be the real-valued, cardinal represen-




G(C)=( G(Ci))i∈N ∈ R
n
+ | C ∈ C
ª
.
Let ∂G(C) be the upper boundary of G(C).S i n c e C is derived from an
underlying economic environment e =( M,cm,x) ∈ E,w h e r ecm is a proﬁle
13of opportunity correspondences satisfying the requirements (a), (b), (c), and
(d), and G is continuous on K, ∂G(C) constitutes a connected set in Rn
+.
Moreover, since C is comprehensive4 by the requirements (a), (b), and (d)
of opportunity correspondences, G(C) must be comprehensive. Finally, by
choosing G({0})=0for the zero vector 0 ∈ Rk






5.1 The egalitarian solution
We ﬁrst give a characterization of the egalitarian solution and its proof fol-
lows.
Theorem 1: The egalitarian solution FE is the unique solution satisfying
(WE), (S), (CI) and (II).
Proof. First, it may be checked that FE satisﬁes the four axioms of the
theorem.
Next, we show that if a solution F satisﬁe s( W E ) ,( S ) ,( C I )a n d( I I ) ,t h e n
F = FE. Let us choose any bargaining problem C ∈ Σ, which is derived
from an underlying economic environment e =( M,cm,x) ∈ E. Suppose











.G i v e nC,w ed e ﬁne
C (i) ≡ {C0
i ∈ K|∃C−i ∈ Kn−1 :( C0
i,C−i) ∈ C} for each i ∈ N.F o r e a c h
i ∈ N and each r ∈ R+,d e ﬁne
C (i;r) ≡ {C
0
i ∈ C (i) | G(C
0
i)=r}.
Let r∗ ≡ G
∗
.C o n s i d e r comp{r∗} ≡ {r ∈ Rn
+ : r ≤ r∗},a n dC∗ ≡
G−1 (comp{r∗}).
Insert Figure 1 around here.
Since G is continuous, we can choose a continuous sequence C∗
s ⊆ C∗ in
which (i) for each r ∈ comp{r∗}, there exists a unique (C
ri




i ∈ C (i;ri) for each i ∈ N; (ii) for each r,r0 ∈ comp{r∗},f o re a c h











i if ri >r 0
i; and (iii)
4C is comprehensive if, for each C ∈ C and each i ∈ N with Ci 6= {0},t h e r ee x i s t sC0
∈ C such that C0
i <C i and C0
j ⊆ Cj for all j ∈ N\{i}.













Now, by using the information of C∗
s, we are ready to construct e∗ =
(M∗,b c1,x∗) ∈ E,i nw h i c hM∗ ∩ M = ∅, #M∗ =1 ,a n dx∗ =1 .M o r e o v e r ,
for each i ∈ N, the opportunity correspondence b c1
i is deﬁned as follows:










i = nx · r∗
i;a n d









Then, consider C∗∗ ≡ C (e∗) ∈ Σ.
By (CI), r∗ ∈ G(F (C∗∗)). Next, consider C4 ≡∪ π∈Ππ(C∗∗).
Insert Figure 2 around here.












. First, deﬁne an opportunity
correspondence cn :[ 0 ,x∗]
n → Rk
+ by: for every x =( xi)i∈N ∈ [0,x∗]
n,
cn (x) ≡∪ i∈Nb c1
i (xi).C o n s i d e r e(n) =( M∗(n),cn,(x∗)
n) ∈ E,w h e r ecn
i =



















Insert Figure 3 around here.
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,a n yi ∈ N,a n yr ∈ [0,λr · ri],a n da n yx ∈ (cn)
−1 ◦ G−1 (r),l e t





,i fλr · ri <r i,t h e nf o r
any r ∈ (λr · ri,r i],a n da n yx ∈ (cn)
−1 ◦ G−1 (r),l e tc4n (x) ∈ G−1 (λr · ri).
Then, e4 ≡ (M∗(n),c4n,(x∗)




















From the construction of C
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Insert Figure 4 around here.







= G(F (C∗∗)), which is a desired contradiction, since
r∗ ∈ G(F (C∗∗)).





= ∅. By (II), clearly, F = FE.
5.2 The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
We now turn to a characterization of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.
Theorem 2: Let the social evaluation of opportunity setsR be homothetic.
Then, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution FK is the unique solution satisfying
( W E ) ,( S ) ,( I A C C ) ,( W C I )a n d( I I ) .
Proof. First, it can be checked that FK satisﬁes the ﬁve axioms of the
theorem. Next, we show that if a solution F satisﬁes the axioms of (WE),
(S), (IACC), (WCI) and (II), then F = FK.L e t G : K → R+ cardinally
represent the homothetic ordering R so that G is homogeneous of degree l for
some positive integer l.L e tC ∈ Σ be an arbitrary problem derived from an
underlying economic environment e =( M,cm,x) ∈ E.G i v e nt h i sG(C),f o r
each i ∈ N,l e tmi (G(C)) be the point such that (mi (G(C)),0−i) ∈ G(C),





∈ ∂G(C) be the point in the G-space of the Kalai-
Smorodinsky solution. Now, let us choose the n dimensional positive vector
a =( ai)i∈N ∈ Rn
++ appropriately, so that
C
0 = a ·C≡
©
a · C =( ai · Ci)i∈N ⊆ R
kn
+ | C ∈ C
ª

























i ≡ ai · ai · ...·ai | {z }
l-times
has the property that, for each i ∈ N, G
K(C0)
i = rK ∈ [0,1].
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∗
. Given the bargaining












Next, for each i ∈ N and each r ∈ R+,w ed e ﬁne
C
0 (i;r) ≡ {C
0
i ∈ C
0 (i) | G(C
0
i)=r}.
Let ei ≡ (mi (G(C0)),0−i) for each and every i ∈ N.
Consider comp{r∗,e1,...,en} ≡ {r ∈ Rn
+ : x ≤ r∗} ∪ {r ∈ Rn
+ : r ≤
e1} ∪ ...∪ {r ∈ Rn
+ : r ≤ en},a n dC00 ≡ G−1 (comp{r∗,e1,...,en}).S i n c e
G is continuous, we can choose a continuous sequence C00
s ⊆ C00 in which (i)
for each r ∈ comp{r∗,e1,...,en}, there exists a unique (C
ri




i ∈ C0 (i;ri) for each i ∈ N; (ii) for each r,r0 ∈ comp{r∗,e1,...,en},











i if ri >r 0
i; and (iii)













We now use the information about C00
s to construct e00 =( M00,b c1,x00) ∈ E,
in which M00 ∩ M = ∅, #M00 =1 ,a n dx00 =1 .F o r e a c h i ∈ N,t h e
opportunity correspondence b c1
i is deﬁned as follows: for all x ∈ [0,1],
(i) b c1
i (1) = C1









i ,a n db c1
i (0) = {0};






i (x)={0};a n d

























i ;a n d






i (x)=Cr00 with r00 =
2nx−(n+1)




s = C (e00) ∈ Σ.
17By (WCI), r∗ ∈ G(F (C00
s)). Next, consider C4 ≡∪ π∈Ππ(C00
s). We will












.F i r s t ,d e ﬁne an opportunity correspondence cn :
[0,x00]
n → Rk
+ by: for every x =( xi)i∈N ∈ [0,x00]
n, cn (x) ≡∪ i∈Nb c1
i (xi).
Consider e(n) =( M00(n),cn,(x00)
n) ∈ E,w h e r ecn
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,t h e r e
exists a scalor λr ≥ 0 such that λ(r)=( −λr + ri)i∈N ∈ ∂G
¡
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.D e ﬁne an
opportunity correspondence c4n :[ 0 ,x00]
n → Rk
+ as follows: For any i ∈ N,
any (−λr + ri)i∈N ∈ ∂G
¡
C4¢
,a n yr ∈ [0,−λr + ri],a n da n yx ∈ (cn)
−1 ◦





and any i ∈ N,i f
−λr + ri <r i,t h e nf o ra n yr ∈ (−λr + ri,r i],a n da n yx ∈ (cn)
−1 ◦ G−1 (r),
let c4n (x) ∈ G−1 (−λr + ri). Then, e4 ≡ (M∗(n),c4n,(x∗)
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s)), which is a desired
contradiction, since r∗ ∈ G(F (C00





(II), we can conclude that F = FK.
5.3 The Nash solution
In this subsection, we will provide a characterization of the Nash solution.
Theorem 3: Let the social evaluation of opportunity sets R be homothetic.
Then, the Nash solution FNA is the unique solution satisfying (E), (A),
(IACC), (CI) and (II).
To prove Theorem 3, we prove the following lemma, Lemma 1, ﬁrst.
18Lemma 1: Let the social evaluation of opportunity R be given, and G be the





∈ ∂G(C) which are mutually diﬀerent, there exists e0 =
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. Let an economy e =( M,cm,x) ∈ E be such








.B y d e ﬁnition, C0 ⊆ C.











for each i ∈ N. Then, for each r ≥ 0,d e ﬁne
C
0 (i;r) ≡ {C
0
i ∈ C
0 (i) | G(C
0
i)=r}
for each i ∈ N.S i n c eG is continuous, we can choose a continuous sequence
C0






,t h e r ee x i s t sau n i q u e
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i )i∈N ∈ C0
s such that C
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We now construct e0 =( M0,c1,x0) ∈ E,i nw h i c h#M0 =1and x0 =1 .
L e tu sd e n o t et h en−1-dimensional simplex by 4. This simplex is interpreted
as the set of Pareto eﬃcient allocations of the one dimensional commodity
x0 =1 .E a c hv e r t e xei ∈ 4 corresponds to the allocation that x0 is assigned
to individual i ∈ N and any other individual gets nothing. Now, take a
continuous bijection λ : ∂G(C0
s) → 4 such that for any r ∈ ∂G(C0
s),t h e r e
exists a scalor λr > 0 such that λ(r)=( λr · ri)i∈N ∈ 4. With the help of
this mapping, c1 of the underlying economy e0 =( M0,c1,x0) ∈ E is deﬁned
as follows: for each i ∈ N, c1




whenever ri =( λr)
−1 (x). Then, C (e0)=C0
s ∈ Σ holds. By deﬁnition,







P r o o fo fT h e o r e m3 :It can be checked that FNA satisﬁes the ﬁve axioms
of the theorem. We need only to show that if a solution F satisﬁes the ﬁve
axioms speciﬁed in Theorem 3, then F = FNA.
19Let F be a solution satisfying the ﬁve axioms of Theorem 3. Let G : K →
R+ cardinally represent the homothetic ordering R so that G is homogeneous
of degree l for some positive integer l. Consider any bargaining problem C ∈ Σ
that is derived from an underlying economic environment e =( M,cm,x) ∈ E.






The set of the solutions for the above problem constitutes the Nash-solution
set FNA(C) for C.
















Consider case (i) ﬁrst. Given the bargaining problem C,w ed e ﬁne C (i) ≡
{C0
i ∈ K|∃C−i ∈ Kn−1 :( C0












. Then, by Lemma 1, we can construct a
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Let r∗∗ ≡ G
∗
+ε.S i n c er∗∗ ≤ m(G(C)), there exists a proﬁle of opportunity
Cr∗∗ ∈ Kn such that for each i ∈ N, C
r∗∗
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. Then, we can construct another econ-


















i ,w ec h o o s et h en dimensional pos-
itive vector a =( ai)i∈N ∈ Rn
++ appropriately as in the proof of Theo-
rem 1 in Xu and Yoshihara (2006), so that (air∗∗



















for some permutation π0 ∈ Π.B y h o -
motheticity of R, e000 =( M00,a
1








Next, consider C4 ≡∪ π∈Ππ(C000). We will construct a new economy
e4 =( M4,c4n,x4) ∈ E such that C
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20First, deﬁne an opportunity correspondence cn :[ 0 ,x00]
n → Rk
+ by: for every
x =( xi)i∈N ∈ [0,x00]




i (xi). Let us consider e(n) =
(M00(n),cn,(x00)
n) ∈ E,w h e r ecn
















































, there exists a scalor λr > 0 such that
λ(r)=( λr · ri)i∈N ∈ ∂G
¡
C4¢
.D e ﬁne an opportunity correspondence c4n
as follows: For any (λr · ri)i∈N ∈ ∂G
¡
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,a n yi ∈ N,a n yr ∈ [0,λr · ri],a n d
any x ∈ (cn)






if λr · ri <r i, then for any r ∈ (λr · ri,r i],a n da n yx ∈ (cn)
−1 ◦ G−1 (r),
let c4n (x) ∈ G−1 (λr · ri). Then, e4 ≡ (M00(n),c4n,(x00)
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= G(F (C0)), a contradiction since G
∗
∈

























. Following a similar proof method as for case (i),
we can derive another contradiction.
The two cases (i) and (ii) exhaust all possibilities. Therefore, it is true
that F = FNA.
5.4 Interpretations
Structurally, our axioms and solutions are similar to those of standard bar-
gaining problems. However, we believe that interpretations of our results are
quite diﬀerent from those of standard bargaining models.
21First, in the standard bargaining model with individual utilities, a solu-
tion can be regarded as the recommendation from the viewpoint of equality
of resources (Dworkin (1981)), as discussed in Roemer (1986, 1988) and in
Yoshihara (2003, 2006)5. On the other hand, as we already discussed in the
Introduction, a solution in our context is closely linked with the principle
of equality of opportunity (Roemer (1998)). The principle of equal opportu-
nity is to “equalize” the playing ﬁelds for all individuals as much as possible
(Roemer (1998)), and each of our three solutions embodies this idea.
Secondly, implications of each of our three solutions on equal opportunity
mechanisms can be very diﬀerent. For instance, Roemer (1998) argues that
an optimal equal opportunity policy should guarantee equal opportunity of
accessing to the same level of “advantage” regardless of their “types” for any
two individuals, as long as their eﬀort ranking within their own “types” are
identical. In our model, we may interpret an individual’s type in the sense of
Roemer as reﬂected in the individual’s opportunity correspondence when the
diﬀerence in individuals’ opportunity correspondences is due mainly to the
diﬀerence in individuals’ native talents or circumstances. In such a context,
the egalitarian solution seems the most reasonable solution based on the
principle of equal opportunity since it guarantees an “equal” assignment of
opportunities among individuals.
However, when the diﬀerence in individuals’ opportunity correspondences
is also based on the diﬀerence in their supply of eﬀort levels, the egalitar-
ian solution may no longer be the most reasonable solution in our context.
This is because it ignores the responsibility aspect (Fleurbaey (1998)). For
example, when there is an enlargement or a shrinkage of an individual’s
opportunity set, we want to ﬁnd out whether or not the individual is re-
sponsible for such a change of his opportunity sets. When such information
becomes available and responsibility factors are identiﬁable, the Nash and
Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions are more reasonable than the egalitarian solu-
tion, since responsibility and compensation may be captured by, respectively,
the axiom IACC and contraction-type axoims, and both the Nash solution
5Yoshihara (2003, 2006) shows that the Nash solution is the most plausible bargaining
solution for the Dworkinian resource egalitarianism if one uses the principle of responsi-
bility and compensation as discussed in Fleurbaey (1998). According to Yoshihara (2003,
2006), the scale invariance axiom in the standard bargaining model with individual utili-
ties can be regarded as an axiom of responsibility for individual utility functions, while the
monotonicity type axiom and the contraction independence axiom can be seen as axioms
of compensation.
22and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution satisfy IACC and various versions of
contraction axioms.
5.5 Subjective Measures of Opportunity Sets
So far, we have assumed that there is an objective measure of opportunity sets
across individuals. One may argue that the objective measure is “too pater-
nalistic” and one should allow possibilities of self-evaluations of opportunity
sets by individuals. Thus, for each individual i ∈ N, there is an ordering Ri
over the set of all opportunity sets. If we adopt this approach, we can ob-
tain similar characterization results of the Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky
solutions by making following observations.
For each i ∈ N,l e tGi be a real-valued function representing i’s personal
evaluation, Ri, of opportunity sets satisfying Monotonicity, Cardinal Repre-
sentability and Homotheticity. For each i ∈ N,l e tIi stand for the symmetric
part of Ri. Consider now the following axiom:
S-Informational Invariance (SII): For each C ∈ Σ and each C =( Ci)i∈N,C0 =
(C0
i)i∈N ∈ C, if C ∈ F(C) and (C0
i,C i) ∈ Ii for all i ∈ N,t h e nC0 ∈ F(C).
Therefore, according to (SII), if two opportunity assignments are “equivalen-
t” in the sense that the two opportunity sets for each and every individual
speciﬁed by the corresponding opportunity assignments are ranked equally
according to their subjective evaluation of opportunity sets, then whenever
one opportunity assignment is in the solution, the other should be in as well.
With the possibility of personal evaluation of opportunity sets and the
above axiom (SII), we can obtain the following results. The proofs of them
are similar to those of Theorems 2 and 3 and we therefore omit them.
Theorem 4: Let each Ri (i ∈ N) be homothetic. Then, the Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution FK is the unique solution satisfying ( W E ) ,( S ) ,( I A C C ) ,( W C I )a n d
(SII).
Theorem 5: Let each Ri (i ∈ N) be homothetic. Then, the Nash solution
FNA is the unique solution satisfying (E), (A), (IACC), (CI) and (SII).
236C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have extended the standard bargaining model to situations
in which players are characterized by their opportunity sets rather than by
their utilities and in which the fair arbitrator makes the recommendation
with the guiding principle of equal opportunity for all players. In such a
setting, we have formulated our problems in terms of bargaining problems
among players on opportunity assignments, deﬁned several solution concepts
such as the Nash solution, the egalitarian solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution in our contex and studied them axiomatically. Most of the axioms
used in our axiomatic characterizations of the proposed solutions are their
counterparts in standard bargaining models, but formulated in terms of op-
portunity assignments. We have discussed and commented on the axioms
that are unique in our context.
We should mention that, in our characterizations of the Nash and the
Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions, we assume that the function G is homothetic.
As we argued in Section 3, in our context, the homotheticity of G is a rea-
sonable property. Nevertheless, if one abandons this property on G,w ec a n
obtain similar characterizations of the Nash and the Kalai-Smorondinsky
solutions by replacing (IACC) with the following axiom:
Modiﬁed Invariance to Aﬃne Changes in opportunity Correspon-
dences (MIACC): For each C,C0 ∈ Σ, if there exists a vector a =( ai)i∈N ∈
Rn





i)=aiG(Ci),i∈ N,C ∈ C
ª
,t h e n
C ∈ F(C) ⇔ C0 ∈ F(C0) whenever G(C0
i)=aiG(Ci) for all i ∈ N.
(MIACC) has a similar intuition as that of (IACC), and is a reasonable
property given that G is cardinal.
Our approach is, we believe, a ﬁrst attempt to extend the standard bar-
gaining model to a setting in which individuals are characterized by their
opportunity sets, and opens a new avenue for understanding bargaining prob-
lems.
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Figure 3: Theorem 1 (3) 
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